Design and capabilities
Datalink override, as a category, would act directly on a drone's command-and-control or navigation link - rather than on the wider satellite constellation - to seize or corrupt the aircraft's course, through jamming the link outright, feeding it spoofed navigation data, or some combination of both. That mechanism is technically real and distinct from GPS jamming or spoofing in the general electronic-warfare literature. Important caveat: none of the specific Baltic incidents below has been shown, in the sourcing reviewed for this entry, to involve a confirmed command-link takeover as opposed to broader GPS/GNSS jamming or spoofing pushing a drone off its intended course - the officials quoted describe "Russian electronic warfare" generally, not a documented datalink-hijack mechanism.
Operational history
A wave of 2026 Baltic airspace incidents has been linked to Ukraine's campaign against Russian Baltic Sea oil export terminals, with officials in each case attributing the diversion broadly to Russian electronic warfare rather than specifying a mechanism. On 25 March 2026, a drone struck the chimney of the Auvere power station in Estonia, about two kilometres from the Russian border; on 19 May 2026, a Romanian Air Force F-16 flying NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission downed a suspected Ukrainian drone over Lake Võrtsjärv, Estonia, the first such shootdown on Estonian territory in the war. On 7 May 2026, at least two Ukrainian drones diverted into Latvian airspace, one striking a fuel depot at Rēzekne without casualties; the incident led Prime Minister Evika Siliņa to dismiss Defence Minister Andris Sprūds over the response. On 8 June 2026, a French Rafale operating from Šiauliai, Lithuania, shot down a drone over Nautrēni Parish in Latvia, roughly 15 kilometres from the Russian border; Latvia's military did not confirm the drone's origin but said it had entered Latvian airspace "as a result of Russian electronic warfare."
AirVeto context
This entry uses the "datalink override" name but makes the mechanism explicit as suspected rather than demonstrated in any single cited case - the documented pattern is broad, officially-attributed electronic-warfare diversion, not a confirmed link-takeover. AirVeto readers should treat any drone recovered well outside its likely intended flight path, in this stretch of border, as evidence of electronic-warfare diversion generally, not as confirmation of command-link hijacking specifically, unless a future source documents the mechanism directly.