Drone and airspace glossary
Definitions of UAVs, loitering munitions, naval drones, and electronic-warfare techniques documented in AirVeto's EU eastern border incident coverage.
Drones and munitions
- Chaika(Seagull)
Ukrainian fixed-wing decoy UAV · Ukrainian armed forces
Single-use radar decoy deployed in coordinated swarms ahead of strike missions to divert air-defence systems. Non-explosive.
On AirVeto: Kouvola, Finland — 29 March 2026
- Gerbera
Russian fixed-wing decoy UAV · Russian armed forces
Single-use radar decoy, non-explosive. Released ahead of strike waves to saturate air-defence networks. Visually resembles the Shahed-136 airframe.
On AirVeto: Majdan Selce, Poland — September 2025 · Gałczyce mine, Poland — March 2026
- Lancet
Russian loitering munition · Russian armed forces
TV- or electro-optical-guided kamikaze drone designed for anti-armour and anti-artillery use. Produced by Zala Aero (Kalashnikov Concern). Operates over Ukrainian battlefield; not confirmed in EU airspace incursions.
- Magura V5
Ukrainian autonomous naval drone (USV) · Ukrainian armed forces / Security Service of Ukraine
Sea-going uncrewed surface vessel used for maritime strike operations in the Black Sea. Armed with explosives; designed to ram or detonate near targets.
On AirVeto: Constanta port, Romania — 5 June 2026
- Orlan-10
Russian medium-endurance ISR drone · Russian armed forces
Fixed-wing, gasoline-powered reconnaissance UAV developed by Special Technology Centre (STC), St Petersburg. Used for artillery correction and battlefield surveillance.
- Shahed-136(Geran-2)
Loitering munition · Iran (Shahed-136); Russia under licence as Geran-2
One-way attack drone that glides to a target and detonates on impact. Recognisable by its distinctive delta wing and loud two-stroke engine note.
On AirVeto: Osiny, Poland — 20 August 2025
- Hornet
Ukrainian balloon-drone hybrid · Ukrainian partisan / intelligence networks
Balloon-lifted payload carrier used to transport munitions or incendiary material across the Russian border. Exploits prevailing winds; no engine or active guidance.
On AirVeto: Ukraine Hornet balloon-drone — AirVeto blog
Electronic warfare
- GPS spoofing
Electronic warfare technique · State actors (Russia documented in EU/Baltic region)
Transmission of false GPS signals that override genuine satellite navigation. Affected receivers report an incorrect position. Distinguishable from jamming because the receiver shows a signal — at a wrong location.
- GNSS jamming
Electronic warfare technique · State actors (Russia documented in EU/Baltic region)
Broadcast of high-power noise on GNSS frequencies (GPS L1/L2, GLONASS, Galileo) to overwhelm satellite signals. Affected receivers lose position lock entirely. Distinct from spoofing: jamming causes loss-of-signal, not a false position.
- Datalink override
Electronic warfare technique · State actors
Disruption or takeover of a drone's command-and-control radio link. Can cause the drone to loiter, return-to-home, or crash depending on its failsafe logic. The Kouvola (March 2026) and Nautrēni (June 2026) incidents both involved Russian EW acting on Ukrainian drone datalinks.
See the incidents →
Every entry links to a real event AirVeto has covered — wind data, coordinates, and source documentation included.